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Abstract
European-style matchlock guns changed the nature of war in Sengoku-period Japan. How much
change was brought by the introduction of guns remains a question today. The traditional story is
that when Portuguese merchants got shipwrecked on Japan, the Japanese people took their guns
and reverse-engineered them. Within a hundred years, European-style matchlock guns
completely changed the nature of warfare. For example, historians traditionally thought that in
the Battle of Nagashino, Oda Nobunaga used volley fire techniques to beat his Takeda rivals.
However, Thomas Conlan argues that the introduction of guns was not impactful on the
battlefield of Japan. He claims that the Battle of Nagashino was fought without volley fire and
that even without guns, the Oda clan would have won the battle. He argues that the introduction
of the pike in Japanese warfare, combined with better organization techniques, allowed for more
men to be fielded. Thomas Conlan further argues that the pike and organization techniques were
the primary factors in the change in Japanese warfare.
This argument is compelling, but, unfortunately, downplays the use of guns and sidelines them. I
will argue that guns did, in fact, change the nature of the battlefield and had a tremendous impact
on Japanese warfare. However, this change was not an isolated impact. It was an evolution of
tactics and techniques rather than a revolution. The gun built upon the changes brought about by
pikes and new organizational techniques, such as the idea of massed infantry. These techniques,
when combined with pikes, shifted warfare away from mounted archers with samurai to ashigaru
foot soldiers in massed infantry formations. We see this change around the time of the Onin war,
which saw the shift away from horse archers to massed infantry. When matchlock guns started to
appear in Japan, the idea of massed infantry was already a mainstay in war. Around the 1570’s
we see another evolution in combat when the use of guns came to play a far more important role
in battles than ever before, and its impact started to become better understood. Before the 1570s,
guns were used in battle often, but they often played a small or unimportant role in battles due to
their impact not being fully utilized. When the impact of guns and the idea of how to properly
use them became better understood, they started to play a far more important role on the
battlefield. In the battle of Nagashino, guns played an important role, causing around 50 percent
of all casualties. Even without volley fire, guns were still an essential factor in the victory of this
battle. Guns did not come to Japan and change the nature of warfare by themselves. Guns
impacted warfare with an evolution building upon already existing change because without that
change, and guns most likely would have never played such an important role.

2

Introduction
The military revolution theory states that beginning in the 1400s, Europe's development
of more effective gunpowder weapons and superiority in military drill and discipline allowed
European states to dominate the world. This theory has many flaws, one of which is that many
world regions were undergoing similar changes in warfare at around the same time; this point
has led to some scholars arguing that changes in European warfare from the 1400s to the 1600s
were neither unique nor a guarantee of world dominance.
Japan, which is the focus of this essay, underwent its own military revolution, or series of
revolutions, from the Onin war to the end of the Sengoku period. Scholars debate whether it was
the gun or other technologies that had the most impact on Japanese warfare. One side argues that
matchlock guns from Europe dramatically changed the nature of warfare immediately after they
were introduced to Japan, with the changes being almost instantaneous. The other side argues
that it was the pike and organizational and logistical techniques that revolutionized Japanese
warfare decades before matchlock guns arrived and that guns were far less transformative. When
looking solely at Japan, it can be easy to get lost in this argument, but when comparing it to other
examples of military revolutions around the world, it can be seen that the use of matchlock guns
built on other changes, without which matchlock guns would not have made a significant impact
on Japanese warfare. Nonetheless, I will argue in this paper that matchlock guns did make
possible a second wave of revolutionary change in Japanese warfare. In other words, there were
two military revolutions in Sengoku-period Japan, about a century apart.
Matchlock guns would not have been very successful in making an impact before the
Onin War because warfare before the 1460s was not conducive to the use of matchlock guns.
This is a situation very similar to Europe before the military revolution happened. Looking at
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Japan exclusively can make people believe that this was an exclusive event, much like how
people once thought that the military revolution was exclusive to Europe. In fact, there was a
global change in the way people fought wars and battles. By analyzing the Japanese military
revolution from a global and comparative perspective, we can gain more insight into the changes
that happened to Japan during this time, and hopefully, this essay can bring new insight into the
debates about Japan’s changes.
In this essay, I will try to show that the changes in warfare during the Sengoku Jidai have
many parallels to changes that were going on in other parts of the world at the time. By
understanding the similarities, we can develop an even better understanding of the changes that
happened to Japan during this period. We will start by looking at the changes that happened to
Japan during this period and looking at the arguments that historians have made about them. I
will then compare them to different versions of the military revolution model in European history
to gain a clearer image of what happened during this period.
The traditional argument vs the new argument
The argument about the role of matchlock guns in Sengoku-period Japan has been going
on for a long time, with the traditional theory, dating from the mid-twentieth century, represented
by Delmer Brown, who argued:
As a direct result of the adoption of firearms, close combat was largely replaced by long-range fighting. A
barrage of bullets from muskets was generally sufficiently effective to determine the outcome of a battle
before the opposing forces came into direct contact. In case the enemy's advance was not checked, bows
and arrows, and finally spears and swords, were used to supplement gunfire, but the new emphasis upon
long-range fighting brought revolutionary developments in the organization of armies and in military
tactics.1
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Brown's argument follows a type of technological determinism that blinds him to the role of
human agency. He argues that guns must have changed warfare because of their nature as a
superior weapon to the bow. Due to the increased range and armor-piercing power over bows,
guns must have become the leading weapon in Sengoku-period Japan as soon as they were
introduced, resulting in battles being decided by large rows of massed musketeers.
The newer argument spearheaded by people like Thomas Conlan suggests that matchlock
guns played a minimal role in reforming the battlefield in Sengoku-period Japan. He, instead,
argues that "[t]oo often historians have thought that guns caused the rise of these massed tactics,
but in fact, they predominated well before the gun was widely used." Because massed tactics
need large numbers of soldiers, daimyo needed more effective tactics to raise more soldiers. The
method of raising armies before the Onin War was to call on one’s vassals or retainers, who
would then call on their own retainers, and much like Russian nesting dolls, there were numerous
retainers one leader could call up, each with a relatively small number of fighting men. But
during the Onin War, new centralized strategies for raising troops allowed for more men to be
fielded at a time. Conlan argues that the pike (a kind of long infantry spear) gained more
importance from this change because it could be used in massed infantry formations. Without
men to use in large formations, the pike is just a long spear whose wielder cannot withstand a
group of cavalry for long. Because of new techniques for organizing soldiers, it became easier to
use massed infantry armed with pikes. When pikes are used in massed infantry formations, it
becomes easier to deal with cavalry archers, who were the mainstay of Japanese warfare before
this. Conlan argues that pikes were the leading change behind the development of massed
infantry tactics:

5
By 1467 pikemen had become the dominant figure of the 15th-century army. Their significance highlights
the greater cohesion of fighting units and improved military organization, as units were capable of training
together and remaining together in the field. The establishment of what can be considered a standing army
led to profound changes in patterns of warfare, favoring formations of men on foot wielding pikes over
their mounted adversaries.2

According to Conlan, Japanese armies began to use matchlock guns on a larger scale, but they
did not change the battlefield much because most of the changes that matchlock guns could have
brought were already present because of pikes.
The new argument agrees with the traditional view that there was a military revolution in
Japan, but credits the revolutionary change to pikes, not guns. Conlan, in making his argument,
looks towards battle reports, which are after-action reports submitted by samurai to their lords to
describe their contribution and sacrifices. Conlan bases his argument on these battle reports and
argues that the rate of injuries from pikes was much higher than casualties from guns until
around 1560, and bows still killed more than guns until the 1600’s. But statistics alone cannot
prove that guns had no significant impact on battles even if they were used in smaller numbers
and not uniformly by all armies. There may have been various circumstances that led to guns not
being used, but that doesn't mean that they weren't important.
The military revolution model and its comparisons to Japanese history
The military revolution model in Europe suggests that because of European
advancements in drill, tactics, and gunpowder technologies in the thirteenth to fourteenth
centuries, Europe was able to conquer the world. However, while it is true that European states
underwent changes in warfare during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, this was not limited
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to Europe, and many Asian states underwent their own changes during this period. These states
were sometimes even ahead of Europe; China, for example, developed the countermarch
technique for use with crossbows in the fourth century BCE, far ahead of Europe.
In the 1990s, Clifford Rogers argued that there was not one but a series of military
revolutions in late medieval and early modern Europe. The first military revolution, also known
as the infantry revolution, produced more disciplined infantry units capable of standing their
ground against heavy cavalry. These infantry consisted of dismounted men at arms or pikemen
supported by archers or crossbowmen and eventually by arquebusiers, cavalry started to act as
more of a support unit before the creation of the cavalry charge tactic. The traditional European
knight or man at arms bears some similarity to the Japanese professional warrior, who was
typically a mounted archer who fought in a skirmishing style supported by a small number of
foot soldiers.3 During the Onin War, Japanese armies shifted from cavalry to Ashigaru (“light
foot”) pikemen in tight formations supported by archers. Japanese daimyo found that large,
well-trained pikemen could hold their ground when attacked by mounted archers and could even
counterattack and defeat cavalry.
After the infantry revolution in Europe, there was an artillery revolution that happened
about one hundred years after the introduction of gunpowder weapons; the artillery revolution in
turn stimulated a revolution in fortifications (which Rogers called an “Artillery Fortress
revolution”4). In Japan, there were numerous reasons, mostly technological, why gunpowder
artillery had less impact, but very similar to the artillery revolution in Europe was the firearms
revolution which followed much the same timeframe and development cycle as Europe. One
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could argue that pikemen and matchlock guns were part of the same infantry revolution in Japan,
but I will argue in a later section that it is useful to see them as two distinct entities.
If we look at the military revolution argument in Europe, we can draw many parallels that
help us better understand the military revolution in Japan. There were two military revolutions in
Europe, the infantry revolution and the artillery revolution. The infantry revolution was when
armies started to change from predominantly heavy cavalry into predominantly massed infantry
(supported by cavalry). This is very similar to what happened to Japan, where foot soldiers with
pikes started to overcome light cavalry (mounted archers), and over time, tactics changed to
favor the new massed infantry formations. Japanese cavalry tactics developed into massed heavy
cavalry charges (which were already the norm in medieval Europe) to overcome the advantage of
massed infantry, and in turn infantry tactics evolved to feature more effective use of guns against
cavalry.
Pikes and infantry
Before the Onin War, soldiers were primarily mounted archers who fought each other in
skirmishes accompanied by their retainers, who would follow them on foot and hold their
weapons, as well as occasionally try to dismount enemy archers. The retainers would also try and
fight off other retainers as well as collect heads. These methods were how people fought for
centuries, from the Gempei War to the Onin war. Conlan states that “surviving records suggest
that no tactical transformations arose prior to 1450.”5 However, during the Onin War, people
shifted away from mounted archers to massed infantry. During the Onin war, much of the capital
of Japan was burned down so that horses would have more room to maneuver inside the city,

5

Conlan, “Weapons

& fighting techniques of the Samurai warrior, 1200-1877 AD” 8 9

8

reflecting the persistence of old habits At the beginning of the Onin War, generals held onto the
idea that mounted archers were the mainstay of fighting, eventually people started to realize that
mounted archers just were not useful in this type of combat, primarily when other people used
massed infantry. Conlan gives us an example from the Onin War:
Masanaga purportedly had a force of 2000 troops which attacked a significantly larger cavalry force of
6000-7000 troops. Masanaga was confident in the prowess for he boasted that I ‘will defeat an army of
even a million men’ and his troops advanced in close formation behind shields. After closing in on the
rokkaku horsemen on the ashy grounds masanagas pike surged towards the enemy, whose horses could not
withstand such a unit of pikemen - 67 horsemen were killed before the rest fled.6

With pikemen crushing a force of cavalry so many times their number, people started to realize
how effective massed infantry could be on the battlefield, and so it was increasingly adopted
until it became the primary method of combat.
Soldiers need a large amount of discipline to withstand being shot at by arrows while
maintaining order properly. In order to use massed infantry effectively, daimyo would need to
train their troops well, and because these new troops mostly came from levied peasants, training
these troops was more difficult than training professional soldiers, so daimyo came up with more
effective ways to have troops in the field for longer, eventually leading to standing armies. The
development of better logistics was needed in order for pikes to be fully effective on the
battlefield. “Pikes had been in use for centuries before commanders were able to realize their full
potential. Improved logistical and organizational abilities allowed for standing armies to be
forged over the course of the 15th-century.”7 With the improvement of logistics and
organizational techniques, standing armies allowed soldiers to undergo more effective training,
which in turn allowed them to be even more effective on the battlefield. These facts made

6

7

Conlan, “Weapons

& fighting techniques of the Samurai warrior, 1200-1877 AD” 9 8-99

Conlan, “Weapons

& fighting techniques of the Samurai warrior, 1200-1877 AD” 8 6

9

pikemen the staple of Japanese warfare for the Sengoku period. Many of the battles were fought
with pikemen as the leading force with the rest of the troops playing a supporting role to the
pikemen; for example, in 1575 a Hojo clan general “led a total force of 5514 men. Of those,
3609 were pikemen, 650 were classified as porters, 321 had guns, 368 had banners, and 566 were
mounted on horseback.”8 The army composition of forces was primarily led by pikemen.
Pikemen were the staple soldier of the Sengoku period and had one of the most substantial
impacts on warfare in the Sengoku period, if not the most. When pikemen became the most
common type of soldier in the war and tactics started to be built around pikemen, other units
started to play a more supporting role in combat. Cavalry, instead of being the primary force,
turned into a supporting role of protecting the flanks of the pikemen as well as doing
reconnaissance in force. Archers deployed on the ground started to become more prevalent
around this time and tended to engage the enemy at long range first, killing some of the enemy
forces before they engaged with the pikemen and trying to cause disorder among the enemy.9
The archers would act in support of the pikemen, acting to make it easier for the pikemen to
defeat the opposing army:
When the two forces had come within five or six ken of each other, expert archers on both sides let loose a
hail of arrows. Arakawa Yojūrō was hit full in the head, just beneath the front rim of his helmet, and fell off
his horse. Enemy soldiers jumped upon his body to drag it to their side, some pulling it by the shins and
others by the gold-encrusted hilt of Yojūrō’s sword. Ours held on to his head and torso. The sword that he
had carried into this battle, people later said, was one ken [1.8 meters] long and five to six sun [fifteen to
eighteen centimeters] wide. Our side first managed to get hold of the sheath and later retrieved Yojūrō’s
sword, his body, and his head as well. The battle raged from the Hour of the Serpent [around 10 a.m.] to the
Hour of the Horse [around noon]. The men would strike blows at each other, draw back, and then return to
strike blows at each other again, unwilling to fall behind their comrades or be outdone by them.10
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This was the new style of battle that came with the development of massed infantry, where the
archers would do their work before the pikemen got into the thick of the fighting.
With these new developments, the style of battle during and after the Onin War
dramatically shifted away from the tradition of mounted horse archers who would shoot from
horseback. Most battles began with a skirmish battle where the ranged units would whittle away
enemy soldiers and try to cause chaos among them, followed by infantry and cavalry then taking
the main stage. Cavalry would try to outflank the enemy or perform a cavalry charge into the
ranks of the enemy combatants, trying to cause as much fear and chaos as possible.
Firearms and cannon in Sengoku-Period Japan
The development of new cavalry techniques was a consequence of the changing ways
wars were fought in the Sengoku period. The new method of using cavalry was the cavalry
charge. With the development of massed tactics, cavalry's role was temporarily redefined into a
supporting role, but with cavalry charges, the cavalry started to become one of the most critical
roles yet again. The development and improvement of gun techniques was a response to the
development of cavalry charges, which could overturn the newfound staple of warfare, the
pikemen.
A consequence of the cavalry charge was that pikes got longer in order to protect
themselves from cavalry with Oda Nobunaga's reportedly being around 20 feet: “If your spear is
short, you’ll be at a disadvantage no matter what.” So he had spears made with a shaft of three to
three and a half ken [5.4 to 6.3 meters].”11 These longer pikes also had another benefit, they were
able to protect the people who used firearms easier. But they had a major drawback in that it was
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much harder for them to be used practically unless the soldier using them had a large amount of
discipline. In the battle of Nagashino pikemen protected the Teppo-gumi (musket squads) from
harm so that the Teppo-gumi could fire more shots into the enemy “The musketeers were
protected as they reloaded, by the ashigaru spearmen.”12 Pikemen protecting the Teppo-gumi was
a very effective strategy. In the battle of Nagashino, Oda Nobunaga clashed with Katsuyori (the
new Takeda clan head after Shingen). In this battle Nobunaga set up a defensive position and
entrenched himself across a river from Katsuyori. Katsuyori tried to attack Nobunaga with a
cavalry charge; he was working on the intel that one of Oda Nobunaga's generals would defect,
so he charged the enemy defensive positions to trigger that defection. He ended up repeating a
charge over and over again and his troops were defeated each time. Guns ended up causing mass
casualties on some of the waves, even killing 50 percent of the third wave: “More than half of
Obata’s warriors were felled by the gunfire….”13 As the battlefield started to shift to
Teppo-gumi, becoming the focus point of the battle where other units supported them, this
change was the firearms revolution.
With firearms taking the primary role in battles, tactics changed, and figuring out and countering
enemy Teppo-gumi became a critical role as well as protecting your own Teppo-gumi. In the
battle of Mikata-ga-Hara, figuring out where the enemy's firearms were became a critical job as a
large amount of snow reduced the visibility dramatically. In this battle, we see an example of
combined arms where all different types of units worked together to defeat their opponent. In the
battle of Mikata-ga-Hara, the Takeda used conscripted soldiers to bait the enemy guns into firing
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on their positions so the Takeda could understand where the enemy firearms were located and
fire their guns into the enemy Teppo-gumi. Using the confusion caused by the Teppo-gumi, the
cavalry were able to charge into the enemy Teppo-gumi and defeat them:
The Tokugawa may have been somewhat surprised by the development, but they responded obligingly with
gunfire from the ashigaru teppo-gumi, who fired blindly into the snow and gloom. Their actions may have
achieved little more than cutting down the ‘forlorn hope’ stone-throwers, although this could be what
Shingen had intended, because the firing disclosed the Tokugawa positions and their likely distance away.
Shingen therefore ordered a response from his own musketeers. Takeda Shingen then took a great risk,
because his musket barrage was followed by a mounted charge into the gloom by the Takeda vanguard
horsemen to the beat of their war drums.14

The Takeda effectively used their troops to combat the enemy’s Teppo-gumi, using different
groups of soldiers. The Takeda took advantage of the weakness of matchlock guns, in that it took
a while for them to reload, and used this time to launch their attack under very little threat of a
barrage by their enemies. The Takeda were very effective at using different units well together,
but the Tokugawa was not as effective at using their troops well together and did not protect their
Teppo-gumi, leaving them vulnerable after exposing them to the enemy. Much like Katsuyori
who didn't use his troops well together and tried to charge the enemy with little regard to what
they had set up. The battle of Mikata-ga-Hara took place two years before the battle of
Nagashino, in that time not that much changed from a technical standpoint. Gun technology
could not have improved much within such a short time, which suggests it was tactics and not
technology that made the difference.

14
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The Ikko Ikki was a sect of Buddhism that participated in the Sengoku Jidai. They fought
against Oda Nobunaga as well as various other lords. They were early supporters of musket
technology and began to use them far earlier than some daimyo. They adopted musket
technology before some daimyo because they needed to in order to fight effectively, as most of
the Ikko Ikki soldiers were just untrained peasant bands. They lacked the training to use
conventional weapons effectively, so they adopted firearms as muskets needed less training to be
useful in battle than other conventional weapons. The Negoro-ji were another sect of militant
Buddhism, but this group, unlike the Ikko Ikki, sided with Oda Nobunaga. They worked with
Oda Nobunaga on many occasions, even fighting together against the Ikko Ikki.15 Two months
before the siege of Osaka castle (one of the castles that the Ikko Ikki controlled) Nobunaga had
one of the first firearms squads created when he combined his firearms troops from various
squads into one squad. He had 500 troops combined into one firearms squad with around 30
archers supporting them.16 This may reflect the influence of both Nobunaga’s Ikko Ikki enemies
and his Negoro-ji allies.
Besides the Battle of Nagashino, Oda Nobunaga’s success against non-daimyo opponents
also reflects the fact that tactics and organization mattered more than the number of guns an
army had. A year after the Battle of Nagashino, Oda Nobunaga launched an attack on the Ikko
Ikki in which the Ikko Ikki had fifteen thousand troops, with a large number of them using guns,
while Oda Nobunaga had only three thousand troops.17 Nevertheless, with those troops, he
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managed to rout the Ikko Ikki forces and win the battle; even after the Battle of Nagashino, it
was not so simple as having more guns meaning certain victory. The key was the effective
application of the guns.
Castle technology also changed during the firearm revolution. Before the Sengoku
period, castles were all built out of wood, and siege technology was extremely late in developing.
For a long time, the tactic to take over a castle in Japan was to overwhelm the castle with
numbers or starve them out without any innovation. It was not until the Onin War that someone
came up with the catapult. During the Sengoku period, with the development of gunpowder
weapons, castle technology advanced, and daimyo started to build castles from stones to better
protect themselves from fire and guns and occasionally cannons, “The existence of powerful
cannon led to marked changes in fortification techniques, as stone walls were relied upon and
castles came to occupy large enough areas to prevent cannon from bombarding their inner walls.
As early as the 1540’s weak sections of walls were fortified with larger stones.”18
Cannons were never able to take off in Japan during the Sengoku period for numerous
reasons. It was too costly, Sengoku-period Japan lacked the metallurgy technology to reproduce
European or Chinese cannons properly, and buying them costs a lot of money. There was not
much of a need for cannons in Sengoku-period Japan either, because castles only really started to
be built out of stone during this period; siege tactics did not advance much. Cannons were
incredibly hard to transport through Japan's mountainous terrain, which made them less viable
for sieges as well as use as field artillery. Cannons never had the need to develop in Japan
although they were very popular in Europe as field artillery, but that required a large amount of

18
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time before they could effectively be used in battle due to their large nature. In Japan, that
innovation happened after Japan was already unified under the Tokugawa.
Volley firing and the battle of Nagashino
In China, the idea of volley fire existed for centuries, being first developed when
crossbows started to become a significant component of Chinese armies during the Warring
States period (475 BC – 221 BC).19 When European-style matchlock muskets came to China,
they also began drilling their musketeers in volley fire by 1560.20 In Japan, we do not know when
people first started to come up with volley fire, but Oda Nobunaga seems to have come up with
the idea rather early as an improvised method of suppressing enemy fire from a fort: “Nobunaga
stated that he would take it upon himself to silence three enemy loopholes and kept them under
constant fire by exchanging one loaded harquebus for another again and again.”21 Oda Nobunaga
may have had the idea of firing in volleys for a while, but training his troops to do it en masse is
a different story. To effectively use volley fire, daimyo needed a well-drilled and trained army or
the troops would not fire and reload in volleys, because some may fire off shots prematurely
while others may take too long to reload.
The Koreans developed one of the most powerful musket armies of the seventeenth
century. Shocked by the Japanese use of muskets and the effectiveness of volley fire in the Imjin
War (the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592-1598), the Koreans rapidly developed musket
techniques to keep up with the Japanese invasion. The Koreans trained their soldiers in the drill
techniques of China: “Korean musketeers were trained in [Ming general] Qi Jiguang’s volley
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technique [using a] Korean drill manual of 1607, based closely on Qi Jiguang’s Ji xiao
xinshu….”22 The Koreans developed one of the best musketeer troops in the world, thanks to
their rapid development of techniques that they adopted from many sources, one of which was
the Japanese forces that the Koreans encountered in the Imjin War and the other was Chinese
drill manuals.23
The independent development of volley fire tactics partially disproves the European
military revolution model. Since East Asia independently developed volley fire techniques
before the Europeans, how could Europeans have used them to take over the world? This
questions the idea of early modern European superiority in drill and tactics over the rest of the
world. Historians should look towards the post-Industrial Revolution European technologies for
real overwhelming military advantages, especially in relation to East Asia.
When and how did Sengoku-period Japanese armies begin using the volley fire
techniques that the Koreans encountered during the Imjin War? Unfortunately, we are still not
sure because of limitations in the Japanese sources. At the battle of Nagashino, the popular myth
was that Oda Nobunaga used his 3000 firearms troops to fire in volleys, thus destroying his
Takeda rivals. However, recently it has become more apparent that this is just a myth:
He and many others have argued that Nobunaga employed the technique in the famous
Battle of Nagashino in 1575.18 This is debatable. As two scholars of Japanese history have recently
written, “the commonly accepted story that attributes the victory [at Nagashino] to three thousand
harquebusiers who, arrayed in three ranks, alternated rank by rank in stepping
forward to fire enfilades and rearward to reload their weapons, is a myth.”This “myth,” they say, originated
in a chronicle written years after the battle that is riddled with inaccuracies. An earlier and more accurate
chronicle (which these scholars have translated into English) makes no mention of volley fire. On the
contrary, when it mentions guns, it usually says they are fired en masse.24
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While it is known that the Japanese did use volley fire, there is no strong evidence that it was
used at the Battle of Nagashino. Volley fire probably was used by the later years of the Sengoku
Jidai, because during the Imjin War, it was one of the main techniques of the Japanese, as
described by Chinese and Korean sources that speak of Japanese armies that “divide themselves
into three groups and shoot alternately by moving forward and backward”25 or “break
into squads and shoot alternately against us.”26 Historians know that it had a presence in Japan,
but it is still debatable whether it was used in the battle of Nagashino.
Conclusion
Japan had its own military revolutions during the Sengoku period, one of which was the
infantry revolution created by the better logistical and organizational capabilities of the daimyo.
These changes started during the Onin War, where the shift away from traditional combat
merged with the new tactics that came from massed infantry, but it was not until later on in the
war that the new style of war began to be understood as a more effective method of fighting. The
shift away from mounted archers mainly acting on their own in combat, to disciplined infantry
units acting in a group was a substantial enough change to be called revolutionary even if it built
upon changes that were already wrought before it. However, it was not just pikemen alone that
made the change. Other units adapted to this new formula of fighting as cavalry started to act
more as support units using shorter spears, and archers were used for supporting the pikemen.

Sŏnjo sillok 宣祖實錄 [Veritable record of King Sŏnjo’s reign], in Chosŏn wangjo sillok
朝鮮王朝實錄 [Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Dynasty] (Seoul: Kuksa p’yŏnch’an
wiwŏnhoe, 1955–1958, juan 50, 1594/4/17 (Ŭlch’uk). Quoted in Kang, Andrade, and Cooper, “A
Korean Military Revolution?,” 65
26
Qiu Xintian 邱心田 (Beijing: Zhong hua shu ju 中華書局, 2001). 31 Song Yingchang 宋應唱,
Jing lüe fu guo yao bian 經略復國要編: [Fourteen juan, futwo juan] (Taipei: Hua wen shu ju 華文
書局, 1968), p. 506. Quoted in Kang, Andrade, and Cooper, “A Korean Military Revolution?,” 65
25
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The firearms revolution, which began about a century after the infantry revolution, was
spurred on by the need to counter new cavalry charge tactics that made infantry more vulnerable
on the battlefield. To counter the new cavalry tactics, daimyo started to use matchlock guns in
larger numbers and concentrations on the battlefield, as seen at Nagashino for example. When
used effectively in conjunction with other weapons (e.g., pikes), matchlock guns can be critical
to victory, but when not used correctly, they are very vulnerable to being overrun by cavalry, as
seen at Mikata-ga-Hara. This essay sought to prove that there was a revolution in firearm
technology and tactics during the Sengoku period, but it was not a singular event; rather, it was
the culmination of progress made slowly over time. One of the problems with the primary
sources that historians have for the Sengoku period is that they are often either not reliable or do
not go into the details needed to understand what was happening in certain situations. The
unreliable sources have led to the debate over what happened at the Battle of Nagashino and
while historians cannot know for sure if volley fire tactics were used at the battle, we do know
that the Japanese used volley fire tactics during the Imjin War and that the Chinese had used
them with crossbows for centuries and were using them with guns by 1560.
When looking at Japan, it can be helpful to compare Japan to Europe because there are
some similarities, which can help understand Sengoku Japan better. Pre-infantry revolution
Europe is very similar to pre-Onin War japan, Cavalry had the most important role, and infantry
played support to the Cavalry; of course, in Japan, it was mounted archers compared to the
knights using lances of medieval Europe. However, similarities exist, such as warfare being a
very ritualized affair. Many of the transitions that happened during Europe's change to massed
infantry are similar to Japan's change to mass infantry.
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In regards to firearms tactics, Japan was ahead of Europe, as Japan had developed the
volley fire technique before the Europeans, disproving the idea that East Asia is stagnant. The
Orientalist stereotype of East Asia paints Japan as a backwards nation that needs European help
in order to be just as enlightened as the Europeans considered themselves. When European
matchlock technology was introduced to Japan, Japan took the technology and ran ahead of
Europe. This goes against the Eurocentric military revolution model, which claims that what
happened in early modern Europe was a uniquely European event. The infantry and firearms
revolution in Japan goes against the idea of East Asia as a stagnant society somehow lesser to
European states, and it also shows that the main drivers behind change in Japan were Japanese
people and not Europeans.

